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Insurance
Bad Faith and
Punitive Damages
After Sloan v.
State Farm
Introduction
Recently the New Mexico Supreme Comt claiified when an instrnction on
punitive damages must be given in an insurance bad faith case. In so doing, the
court resolved a conflict between the New Mexico Court of Appeals and the
Tenth Circuit. 1 The case, Sloan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Association,2
recognized that proof of "bad faith" in an insurance context ordinarily supplies
the culpable mental state necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages. 1
The court's analysis is notew01thy for the effort to clarify the standards for both
first and third patty bad faith. Finally, the court rewrote Un Civil 13-1718 to
comport with its decision.4
The Sloan issue arose when the New Mexico Comt of Appeals in Teague
Strebeck Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Insurance Co.5 concluded from its reading of
Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.6 and Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v.
North River Insurance Company7 that there was a "real distinction" between the
"bad faith" sufficient to prove a simple breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing for an awai·d of compensatory damages and the "bad faith"
sufficient to sustain an award of punitive damages. 8 Therefore, the court of
appeals concluded, in order to recover punitive dainages the insured must
demonstrate some culpable mental state in addition to the "bad faith" necessary to
establish the underlying claim. The comt of appeals also indicated that the
existing Uniform Jury Instruction on bad faith and punitive damages was not an
accurate statement of the law and should be reconsidered. 9 The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, flatly rejected the Teague-Strebeck analysis w, thus
creating a conflict between jurisdictions.
This article analyzes Sloan by examining three interrelated topics. First, Sloan is
placed in context of the historical development of "bad faith" insurance law in
New Mexico. Second, the circumstances in which the Sloan issue arose are
Continued on page 22
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examined and the Supreme Comt's
resolution of the issue is discussed.
Third, Sloan is mined for some
additional observations that may be
of benefit for future bad faith cases.
Insurance Bad Faith
The New Mexico common law has
long recognized that there is a
characteristic of mind that
accompanies the failure to act in
good faith that may provide the basis
for an award of punitive damages.11
From a conceptual vantage, bad faith
impmts an element of scienter
because it implies a conscious
choice, that is a decision not to act in
good faith. Bad faith, although rarely
defined, is often conjoined with other
types of conduct that suggest
culpable states of mind - fraud, 12
1
willfulness or malice,1 wrongful and
14
intentional, improper purpose, 15
arb.1trary acts, 16 a gross abuse of
discretion, 17 or treachery. 18 Bad faith
has also been associated with other
states of mind that do not include a
specific intent to haim, but rather fall
into .a lesser category such as gross
neg11gence 19, reckless conduct,-'O
breach of fiduciary duty.21 There is
also recognition in the law that bad
faith may take place on a continuum
and fall between mere negligence
and a specific intent to haim.22 The
common law therefore classifies bad
faith with other types of wrongful
conduct that suppo1t an awai·d of
punitive damages. The long
standing Unifonn Jmy lnstrnction on
punitive damages embodies the
common law. 21
Bad faith has developed a more
specialized meaning in the insurance
context, but it remains grounded in
conduct that demonstrates a state of
mind beyond that of mere stupidity.
The descriptor "insurance bad faith"
is judicial sho1t hand for a claim
aiising from breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. There is implied into eve1y
contract of insurance a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing." First
recognized in Lujan v. Gonzales,25
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the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is the basis for the
insurer's common law duty to treat
its insured fairly. The breach of the
insurer's implied promise to act
fairly is the basis for the "bad faith"
claim.

insurance bad faith case usually
involves the situation where a third
paity has brought suit against the
insured and the insurer either refuses
to provide a defense asse1ting that
the claims fall outside of coverage or
accepts the defense and fails to pay a
policy limit demand where
warranted. In either case,
the
insured is hai111ed by
The concept of impartiality and fair
the risk of exposure to a
balancing of interests remains at the heart
judgment in excess of the
of New Mexico's law of insurance bad
policy limits, and the third
faith.
paity is affected by the
expense of litigating a
claim that should have
If, as the saying goes, there is a thin
been paid. In the ordinai·y case, in
line between love and hate, there is
order for the injured third party to
an equally fine line between good
assert a claim against the insurer, the
faith and bad faith. The comt of
insured must assign his bad faith
appeals in Lujan recognized the
cause of action against the insurer to
difficulty in parsing the concept of
the third party, which then allows the
bad faith and, significantly, chose to
third paity to pursue recove1y for an
define "bad faith" in reverse, that is
excess judgment against the insurer,
by giving fonn and content to what
or the insured may pursue the "third
constitutes good faith. "What is
party" bad faith claim in exchange
good faith? We do not attempt to
for an agreement by the third party
give a complete definition because of
not to execute on the judgment until
the variety of situations held to
the bad faith action is concluded.10
26
involve a question of good faith."
This second type of bad faith cause
The comt of appeals offered some
is referred to as a "third paity
guidance which remains a good
action."11
measure of bad faith and a useful
analytic starting place.
The distinction between the
circumstances giving rise t.o a first or
We use the term "good faith" in
third paity claim has resulted in
this case to mean an insurer cannot
slightly different tests to detenmne
be paitial to its own interests, but
bad faith. New Mexico adheres to a
must give its interests and the
broad definition of bad faith in first
interests of its insured equal
party cases, described as a "frivolous
consideration.
or unfounded refusal" to pay a
* * *
compensable claim.12 The reason
that a "frivolous and unfounded
To fulfill the duty of giving equal
consideration to the interests of the
refusal" to pay constitutes bad faith
insured and the insurer there must
is because "unfounded" in this
be a fair balancing of these
context means a "reckless disregai·d"
or an "utter failure" to exercise cai·e
interests.27
for the insured's interests.13 The
The concept of impartiality and fair
implied covenant protects against the
balancing of interests remains at the
insurer's bad faith -- i.e. "wrongful
heait of New Mexico's law of
and intentional affronts to the other
insurance bad faith.
paity's rights, or a least affronts
where the breaching party is
There ai·e two basic types of
consciously aware of, and proceeds
insurance bad faith cases.28 The first
with deliberate disregard for, the
14
type is a direct action between an
potential hai111 to the other paity. "
insured and his insurer. This is
Thus, proof of the breach of the
commonly referred to as a "first
implied covenant, or "bad faith,"
party action."29 The second type of
establishes the kind of conduct that
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has traditionally been sufficient to
allow an award of punitive damages.
In a third party claim, the implied
covenant of good faith requires that
an insurer give the interests of its
insured consideration equal to its
own when evaluating a settlement
offer within policy limits." "[G]ood
faith does impose upon the insurer
the duty to settle whenever
practicable."36 Although an insurer's
evaluation of the costs and benefits
of settlement is general I y accorded
some deference, that "judicial
deference lessens whenever there is a
substantial likelihood of a recovery
that exceeds policy limits."37 The
potential for an excess verdict places
the insurer in an "inherent conflict of
interest" with its insured and, under
such circumstances, the insurer
"should place itself in the shoes of
the insured and 'conduct itself as
though it alone were liable for the
38
entire amount of the judgment.' "
Ultimately it is the insurer's decision
or not to exercise "honest judgment
[and] acting on adequate information
after competent investigation of the
claim" that determines whether the
insurer has acted in bad faith.19 The
failure to exercise honest judgment
would be dishonest, a circumstance
that suggests a state of mind that
would, given the historical
definitions of bad faith, sustain an
awar·d of punitive damages.
This body of law seemed well
established until the cou1t of appeals'
decision in Teague-Strebeck Motors
v. Ou:ysler Insurance Co_.u, In a
sho1t opinion on a motion for
reconsideration, the comt of appeals
dete1mined that there were two tiers
of "bad faith." The comt held that
there was innocent "bad faith" that
allowed for a recovery of
compensatory damages and a second
tier of "bad faith" evidencing a
culpable mental state sufficient to
sustain an awar·d of punitive
damages..j' The comt of appeals also
indicated that the existing Uniform
Jury Instruction on bad faith and
punitive damages was no longer an
accurate statement of the law and
should be reconsidered..j" The cou1t

of appeals based its decision on its
reading of two important bad faith
decisions by the New Mexico
Supreme Cowt -- Allsup's
Convenience Stores. Inc. v. North
1
River Insurance Company4' and Paiz
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
.j.j

At least one federal dist1ict cou1t and
the Tenth Circuit flatly rejected the
Teague-Strebeck analysis..j' In the
City of Hobbs v. Hartford Insurance
Co. the federal district cou1t closely
exarnined and rejected the cowt of
appeals' analysis.JI, concluding
instead that the existing jury
instruction on punitive damages in a
11
bad faith case· retained its vitality..j'
The Uniform Jury Instruction on the
bad faith punitive damages UJI Civil
13-1718 (NMRA 2004) provides in
pe1tinent part that:
If you find that plaintiff should
recover compensatory damages for
the bad faith actions of the
insurance company, then you may
award punitive damages.

that some culpable mental state in
addition to "bad faith" was not
necessary to sustain and award of
52
punitive damages. Basically, the
Tenth Circuit accepted the district
cou1t's analysis of New Mexico law,
which it applied in denying the post
trial motions. The Tenth Circuit held
that the directions for use for UJI 131718 remained a coITect statement of
New Mexico law because the New
Mexico Supreme Cou1t has never
51
held them to be invalid. The Tenth
Circuit also found persuasive the fact
that the supreme cou1t had reissued
the directions for use in the general
instruction on punitive damages, UJI
13- I 827, subsequent to its decision
in Paiz v. State Fann Fire &
Casualty Co., that cross-referenced
13-1718 and therefore, the cou1t
concluded, reaffirmed that 13-1718
was a proper instruction for bad faith
cases. The Tenth Circuit's
affirmation of the district cou1t on
this specific point thus created a
clear conflict between the Tenth
Circuit's and the cou1t of appeals'
1
reading of New Mexico law.- .j

The Sloan Issue - Bad Faith Plus

The directions for use of UJI Civil
13-1718 require that it be given in
every action in which the jury is also
instructed on the bad faith claim,
because as noted in the Committee
Comment "bad faith supports
punitive damages upon a finding of
entitlement to compensatory
damages.".j')

The Tenth Circuit, recognizing the
conflict, ce1tified the issue to the
New Mexico Supreme Cornt when
the opportunity presented itself in the
fonn of Sloan v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co." The
question ce1tified was:

The Teague-Strebeck court stated
that the directions for use for UJI 131718 were, after Paiz and Allsup's,
suspect to the extent that they
required giving the instruction on
punitive damages just based on a
showing of a bad faith insurance
practice without the addition of some
50
extra culpable mental state. The
cou1t of appeals held that "there is a
real distinction between 'bad faith'
sufficient to suppo1t an awar·d of
compensatory damages and 'bad
faith' meriting exemplar·y damages.
In approp1iate circumstances 'bad
faith' may include a culpable mental
state, but it is not necessa1ily so."51

ls an instruction for punitive
damages required in every
insurance bad faith case in which
the plaintiff has produced evidence
suppo1ting compensatory damages
as suggested by [UJI 13-1718
NMRA 2003], or is the New
Mexico Cou1t of Appeals coITect
that subsequent New Mexico
Supreme Cornt authority requires a
culpable mental state beyond bad
faith for imposition of punitive
damages in insurance bad faith
cases? Teague-Strebeck Motors.
Inc. v. Chrysler Ins. Co., [1999
NMCA I 09, PP76-90, 27 N.M.
603, 985 P.2d 1183).56

The Tenth Circuit was just as clear·

Sloan was a third pmty "failure to
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settle" bad faith case with a few
twists. 57 Sloan crossed the centerline
and collided head on with a car
caiTying Mr. and Mrs. Shelton and
their two children. Plaintiffs
offered to settle for all family
members for $300,000, the apparent
policy limit. The children's claims
were settled before tiial. The
underlying case was ttied to a jury
and resulted in an excess judgment
of $395,000.58 The jury awarded
$49,500 to Mr. Shelton and
$495,000 to Mrs. Shelton. State
Farm paid the award to Mr. Shelton
and paid $100,000 toward Mrs.
Shelton's awai·ds claiming the policy
contained a $100,000 per person
limit.
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an insured's claim in good faith) and
the third party claim or failure-to
settle cases (those involving breach
of the insurer's duty to settle a third
paity claim against the insured in
good faith). 1160 The comt then
reaffiimed the position that the
imposition of punitive damages
requii·es evidence of some "culpable
mental state." In a depaiture from
the analysis of the court of appeals in
Teague-Strebeck, however, the comt
detennined that "bad faith conduct
by an insurer typically involves a
culpable mental state. "61

Rather than adopt a per se rule, as
suggested by the Committee
Comment to Ull Civil 13-1718, the
comt specifically invested
the trial comt with "the
discretion to withhold a
The simple holding was that in the typical
punitive damages
insurance bad faith case, evidence sufficient to
instruction in those rare
instances in which the
sustain the claim for compensatory damages
plaintiff
has failed to
ordinarily will at least create a question of fact
advance any evidence to
for the jury on the claim of punitive damages.
supp01t an awai·d of
punitive damages."62
Thus, the simple holding
was that in the typical
The bad faith case was tiied to a
insurance bad faith case, evidence
sufficient to sustain the claim for
jury. The jmy found that State Fann
had acted in bad faith and awarded
compensatory damages ordinaiily,
damages. The dist1ict court refused
though not invaiiably, will at least
create a question of fact for the jury
to instruct the jury on punitive
damages, however, granting
on the claim of punitive damages.
defendant a judgment on the issue as
a matter of law. The plaintiffs
The court based its ruling in pait on
ai·gued that the New Mexico jmy
the following language from
instructions, specifically the
Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v.
Committee Comment to 13-1718,
N01th River Insurance Co.63: "[W]hile
required an instruction on punitive
bad faith and unreasonableness are
damages when the evidence is
not always the same thing, there is a
sufficient to instruct on the bad faith
ce1tain point, detennined by the jury,
failure to settle claim thus squarely
where unreasonableness becomes
raising the issue in conflict on
bad faith and punitive damages may
be awarded."64 The "complex factual
appeal.59 This was the posture of the
case when the Tenth Circuit ce1tified
determinations smrnunding the
insurer's conduct and c01Tesponding
the issue.
motives,1165 will ordinaiily requii·e the
The New Mexico Supreme Comt
jury to so1t out whether the evidence
began its analysis by first clarifying
establishes a culpable mental state.
the distinction between first and third
"As a general proposition, therefore,
paity bad faith cases. The comt
once a plaintiff has made a piima
characte1ized a first paity case as the
facie showing sufficient to submit his
"failure-to-pay case (those aiising
or her bad faith claim to the jury, the
from a breach of the insurer's duty to
detennination whether the insurer's
timely investigate, evaluate, or pay
bad-faith conduct is deserving of

punitive dainages is for the jmy to
decide."66
What showing is required?67 The
comt concluded that in a first paity
failure to pay claim, the failure or
refusal to pay has to be fiivolous or
unfounded, which the comt
detennined was the practical
equivalent of reckless disregard, a
mental state traditionally sufficient to ,
awai·d punitive damages.68 For a third
paity failure to settle claiin, the
plaintiff must establish that the
failure to pay was the result of a
"dishonest judgment," which the
comt defined as "a failure by the
insurer to hones_tly and fairly balance
its own interests and the interests of
the insured. 11 69
Wait a minute. This sounds very
much like the evidence that is
required to establish the prima facie
case for insurance bad faith, to reach
the threshold for compensatory
damages. And it is.
The comt reasoned that fovolous and
unfounded refusal to pay is the
equivalent of "reckless disregard for
the interests of the insured and that a
dishonest balancing of interests is no
less reprehensible than reckless
disregard." "Reckless disregai·d" is a
culpable mental state that histoiically
had justified an awai·d of punitive
damages. Indeed, it was the Sloan
court's recognition that "bad faith" in
the insurance context has a
definitional basis which impo1ts a
culpable mental state that formed the
hemt of its analysis.
This recognition led the comt to
conclude that whether "the bad faith
evinced by a paiticulai· defendant
waiTants punitive damages is
ordinarily a question for the jury to
resolve."70 The court therefore
ovenuled Teague-Stt·ebeck to the
extent that it would require an
additional culpable mental state in
71
"every insurance bad faith case."
The court depaited, however, from
the Committee Comment to 13-1718
and what it refened to as the "per se
Jessen rule,"12 which requii·ed that the
jury be instructed on punitive
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unreasonable conduct
reaches a higher state of
culpability was found by
the comt to be inherent in
the Unifonn Jury
77
Instructions that set fo1th
the basic elements of first
and third paity bad faith
cases and to have been aiticulated in
7
the Allsup's case. x The cou1t
concluded that because the degree of
unreasonableness will ordinai·ily be a
question of fact, the usual bad faith
case will require that the question of
punitive damages be submitted to the
jury where the plaintiff has made out
a primafacie case for compensatory
79
dainages.

Perhaps the most salient feature of the
decision is the supreme court's discussion
of the "continuum" on which conduct
evidencing bad faith may occur.
damages in every case in which the
compensatory claim for bad faith
went to the jury. The comt
specifically held that the district
cou1t has the discretion to withhold a
punitive damages instruction "in
those rare instances in which the
plaintiff has failed to advance any
evidence" that would suppo1t an
award for punitive damages.
In order to assure that the jury is
given the proper instruction on
punitive damages in an insurance
bad faith context, the comt modified
UTT Civil 13-1718 to read as follows:
If you find that plaintiff should
recover compensatory damages for
the bad faith actions of the
insurance company, and you find
that the conduct of the insurance
company was in reckless disregard
for the interests of the plaintiff, or
was based on a dishonest
judgment, or was otherwise
malicious, willful, or wanton, then
you may award punitive
71
damages.·
The Comt fu1ther refined its
rew1iting of 13-1718 by requiring
that the instruction include the
definition of "dishonest judgment" as
"a failure by the insurer to honestly
and fairly balance its own interests
74
and the interests of the insured. "
Following the supreme comt's
decision, the Tenth Circuit reversed
75
and remanded for a new trial.

Other Points from Sloan
Perhaps the most salient feature of
the decision is the supreme comt's
discussion of the "continuum" on
which conduct evidencing bad faith
may occur.76 This concept that
unreasonable conduct occurs along a
continuum and that there is some
point at which negligent or

The comt, while acknowledging that
New Mexico has thus far refused to
find a cause of action for the
negligent failure to settle,
neve1theless determined that
evidence of negligence or
unreasonable conduct "provides one
possible means of demonstrating that
an insurer has acted in bad faith."'"
Significantly, the cou1t recognized
that the touchstone for a bad faith
failure to settle cause of action is the
insurer's failure to exercise an honest
judgment in treating the interests of
its insured equal to its own.'1 The
cou1t found that there may be
circumstances in which an insurer
has in fact conducted a competent
and timely investigation of a claim,
but neve1theless has failed to
exercise an honest judgment and
thereby become liable for both
compensatory and punitive
damages."� The comt approp1iately
noted that in those circumstances the
insurer's conduct may be fairly
regarded as more reprehensible than
in the case where the investigation of
1
the claim was simply incompetent.'
What, then, is the imp01t of the
comt's discussion of a continuum of
reasonable or unreasonable conduct?
First, as noted above, the question is
a factual one requiring submission of
punitive damages instructions to the
84
jury in all but the unusual case.
Second, unreasonable conduct in the
investigation and evaluation of a

z u u �
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claim may very well establish a
primafacie case of bad faith failure
to settle, paiticulai·ly when the
unreasonable conduct demonstrates a
failure on the pa1t of the insurer to
give equal consideration to the
interest of the insured. Third, Sloan
opens the door for a reconsideration
of the comt's holding in Ambassador
Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine that the negligent failure to
settle is not a cause of action in and
of itself.''
' Compare Teague-Strebeck Motors Inc. v. Chrysler Insurance Co.,
1999-NMCA-109, 127 N.M. 603,985 P.2d 1183 and City of Hobbs
v Nutmeg Insurance Company. 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31144 (10th
Cir. 2000).
'2004-NMSC-4,85 P3d 230,�N M�
'kL at TI 6,85 P3d at 233-34.
' The Civil Jury Instruction Committee has just published for
comment the Supreme Court's directed revisions to 13-1718. See
43 S.B.B. at 24-25 (November 18,2004). More significant than the
instruction itself which merely recites the Supreme Court's revision,
is the committee comment that Jessen v National Excess
Insurance Co. 108 N.M. 625,776 P.2d 1244 (1989),found that the
"the duty of good faith dealing by the parties to an insurance
contract is a non-delegable duty, breach of which suppcrt vicarious
liability for punitive damages." The comment is cryptic at best,but
suggest that the implied covenant's obligations are duty based and
therefore sound in tort. There continues to be a question whether
in New Mexico the action for insurance bad faith is contract or tort
based. It is arguably a hybrid, but that discussion is reserved for
another day.
'199S-NMCA-109, 127 N.M. 603,985 P.2d 1183.
0 118 N.M. 203,880 P.2d 300 (1994).
'199S-NMSC-6,127 N.M. 1,976 P.2d 1.
'Teague-Strebeck Motors,199S-NMCA-109, TI 85,127 N.M. at
624,985 P.2d at 1202.
'kiatTI82 n.1,127 N.M. at 623,985 P.2d at 1201.
'0 See City of Hobbs v. Nutmeg Insurance Company,2000 U.S.
App. Lexis 31144 (10th Cir. 2000).
,
· Cunningham v. Sugar 9 N.M. 105. 49 P . 910 (N.M. Terr. 1897).
The court in Cunningham v. Sugar recognized as much when it
held that where the only evidence was that the defendant had
acted in good faith,there was no basis to instruct on exemplary
damages. In Cunningham it was clear that the court considered
"bad faith" to be on a par with malicious or intentionally abusive
conduct. 9 N.M. at 112-13,49 P. at 917-18.
"Madrid v. Rodriguez 2003-NMSC-6,TI 7, 133 N.M. 553,557.66
P3d 326,330; Martinez V. Hanns,102 N.M. 2,4, 690 P.2d 445,447
(1984); Chavez v. Sandia Corporation,89 N.M. 578. 555 P.2d 699
(1976); State ex rel. State Park & Recreation Commission v. New
Mexico State Authority,76 N.M. 1,27 411 P.2d 984, 1002 (1966);
Quintana v. Montoya. 64 N.M. 464,469,330 P.2d 549,552 (1958);
Griego v New York Life Insurance Co. 44 N.M. 330. 341, 102 P.2d
31, 37 (1940).
"Torres v El Paso Electric Co ,1999-NMSC-029,TI 53,127 N.M.
729,749,987 P .2d 386,406; State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson,1998NMSC-015,TI61,125 N.M. 343,356,961 P.2d 768,781; Burge v.
Mid-Continent Casualty Co. 1997-NMSC-009,TI 20,123 N.M. 1, 7,
933 P.2d 210, 217; Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.. 118
N.M. 203,210,880 P.2d 300, 307 (1994); Nuclear Corporation v.
Allendale,103 N.M. 480,485,709 P.2d 649,654 (1985) ("To
assess punitive damages for breach of an insurance pclicy there
must be evidence of bad faith or malice in the insurer's refusal to
pay the claim."); Gallegos v Citizens Insurance Agency. 108 N.M.
722,731,779 P.2d 99, 108 (1989); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v.
Kysar Insurance Agency,98 N.M 86,88,645 P.2d 442,444
(1982); Chacon v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co.,82 N.M.
54,475 P.2d 320 (1970); Vigil v. Rice, 74 N.M. 693,699, 397 P.2d
719,723 (1964); Hagerman v. Cowles 14 N.M. 422,94 P 946
(1908).
.
, Jaynes v. Strong-Thome Mortuary. 1998-NMSC-004, TI13,124
N.M. 613,617,954 P.2d 45,49; Continental Potash v. Freeport
McMoran Inc. 115 N.M 690,706,858 P.2d 66,82 (1993) (''The
breach of this covenant requires a showing of bad faith or that one
party wrongfully and intentionally used the contract to the detriment
of the other party."); Watson Truck & Supply Co. v. Males,111 N.M.
57,61,801 P.2d 639,643 (1990) ("Absent any honest pursuit of
interests to which a party to a contract is entitled. i.e.. absent cause
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or excuse,his or her intentional use of the contract to the detriment
of another party is wrongful,constitutes bad faith,and clearly is a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.").
"Schein v. Northern Rio Aniba Electric Cooperative Inc., 1997NMSC--011,� 11,122 N.M. 800,803,932 P.2d 490,493.
"Zamora v. Village of Ruidoso Downs 120 N.M. 778,784,907
P.2d 182,188 (1995) ("'[A]rbitrary' is synonymous with bad faith or
failure to exercise honest judgment and an arbitrary act is one
performed without an adequate determination of principle."); Jones
v. International Union of Operating Engineers,72 N.M. 322, 324,
383 P.2d 571,572 (1963).
" State Highway Commission v. Ruidoso Telephone Co.,73 N.M.
487,500,389 P.2d 606,615 (1964).
"Prior v. Rio Grande Irrigation & Colonization Co.,10 N.M. 711,65
P. 171 (1901).
" Aktiengesellschaft Der Harlander Buamwollspinnerie und Zwim
Fabrik v. Lawrence Walker Cotton Co., 60 N.M. 154,158,288 P.2d
691,693 (1955);Odell v. Colmar Irrigation & Land Co.,34 N.M.
277,283,280 P. 298,400 (1924) ("There must be fraud,or such
gross mistakes which necessarily imply bad faith ... The mistakes
must be so gross as to clearly indicate that such engineer has
acted consciously unjust in the discharge of the duties imposed
upon him,and has thereby violated the rights of the complaining
party."). But see First National Bank v. Stover,21 N.M. 453,476,
155 P. 905, 913 (1916) (Gross negligence alone is not sufficient to
demonstrate bad faith. ''There must be actual knowiedge or bad
faith. Bad faith may be shown by a willful disregard of and refusal
to learn the facts when available and at hand.").
"Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 118 N.M. 203,210,880
P.2d 300,307 (1994) ("[A]n award of punitive damages in a
breach-of-contract case must be predicated on a showing of bad
faith,or at least a showing the breaching party acted with reckless
disregard for the interests of the non-breaching party."); Green Tree
Acceptance Inc. v. Layton 108 N.M. 171,175,769 P.2d 84,88
(1989) (for purposes of punitive damages the record demonstrated
"at least recklessness and bad faith,if not of willful,wanton and
malicious wrongdoing.").
"Flanagan v. Benvie,58 N.M. 525,532,273 P.2d 381,385 (1954);
Roswell State Bank v. Lawrence Walker Cotton Co. 56 N.M. 107,
112,240 P.2d 1143,1146 (1952).
� Roswell State Bank v. Lawrence Walker Cotton Co.,56 N.M. at
116,240 P.2d at 1148 ("At what point does negligence cease and
bad faith begin? The distinction between them is that bad faith,or
dishonesty, is, unlike negligence,willful. The mere failure to make
inquiry,even though there be suspicious circumstances,does not
constitute bad faith (Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Girard Trust Co.,
307 Pa. 488,500,501,161 A 865),unless such failure is due to
the deliberate desire lo evade knowiedge because of a belief or
fear that inquiry would disclose a vice or defect in the transaction that is to say,where there is an intentional closing of the eyes or
stopping of the ears.").
n See UJI Civil 13-1827 ("If you find the conduct of
____was [malicious],[willful],[reckless],[wanton],
[fraudulent] [or] in [bad faith],then you may award punitive
damages.. .").
'' Paiz v. Stale Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 118 N.M. 203,212, 880
P.2d 300,309 (1994);Allsup's Convenience Stores Inc. v. North
River Insurance Co ,1999-NMSC-6,� 33,127 N.M. 1,13,976
P.2d 1,13; Ambassador Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine,
102 N.M. 28,30,690 P.2d 1022,1024 (1984).
"84 N.M. 229,501 P.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1972). The !J!@1 court
explicitly tied the recognition of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing to the insurer's liability for "bad faith." Id. at 236,
501 P.2d al 681 ("In considering Allstate's liability for bad faith,we
need not decide whether an insurer's duty to proceed in good faith
with its insured is an implied covenant in the insurance contract or a
tort...We do hold that such a duty exists...Also,the duty of good
faith is a concept separate from negligence... and ii is a concept
separate from fraud.").
� Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. at 236,501 P.2d at 680.
n kl
• A general description of these two types of bad faith actions is as
follows; "A third party insurance case involves a contention the
insurer failed lo settle a third party's claim against the insured within
policy limits. A first party case,on the other hand, involves a
contention the insurer failed to pay benefits directly to the insured."
McCormick v. Sentinel Life Ins. Co ,153 Cal. App. 3d 1030,1041
n.7,as modified,155 Cal. App. 3d 493 (1984).
n � e.g.,O'Neel v. USAA Insurance Company. 2002-NMCA-28,
131 N.M. 630,41 P.3d 356; Allsup's Convenience Stores v. North
River Insurance Co.,1999-NMSC-6,127 N.M. 1,976 P.2d 1;
Teague-Strebeck Motors Inc. v. Chrysler Insurance Co.,1999NMCA-109,127 N.M. 603,985 P.2d 1183; Paiz v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co ,118 N.M. 203,212,880 P.2d 300,309 (1994).
• In general,the third party does !)Q! have a direct action against
the insurer for its bad faith failure lo settle or the refusal to defend.
The third party may have a claim for violation of the Trade Practices
and Fraud Section of the Insurance Code,NMSA Section 59A-1620. See Hovel v. Allstale Insurance Co. 2004-NMSC-10,
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_N.M.� 89 P.3d 69; see also D.J. Berardinelli, Hovel v.
Allstate: A Long Time Coming - The New "Rules of the Road" for
Uability Insurers, 34 The New Mexico Trial lawyers 57 (2004).
"See,e.g.,Dai/Viand v. Herman, 1998-NMSC-5, 124 N.M. 624,
954 P.2d 56; Rummel v. Lexington Insurance Co., 1997-NMSC-41,
123 N.M. 752 (excess carrier's failure lo settle with insured's claim
assigned to the victim); Ruiz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co , 36
F.Supp.2d 1308 (D.N.M. 1999) (applying New Mexico law); Qjy_Qf
Hobbs v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company. 162 F.3d 576 (10th Cir.
1998) (essentially a third party failure to settle claim, though brought
by the insured).
� Chavez v. Chenoweth,89 N.M. 423,429,553 P.2d 703 (Ct. App.
1976); Jessen v. National Excess Insurance Company 108 N.M.
625,627 n.2, 776 P.2d 1244,1246 n. 2 (1989).
• Jackson National Life Insurance Co. v. Receconi 113 N.M. 403,
419,827 P.2d 118,134 (1992).
"Paiz v. Slate Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,118 N.M. at 212-213,880
P.2d at 309-310.
• Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Herman,1998-NMSC-5,�12,124
N.M. al 628-29,954 P.2d at 60-61; see also Lujan v. Gonzales,84
N.M. 229,236,501 P.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1972).
• kt at� 13,124 N.M. at 629, 954 P.2d al 61.
"kt at� 14,124 N.M. at 629, 954 P.2d al 61.
� kt quoting Johansen v. California Stale Automobile Ass'n,538
P .2d 744, 748 (Cal. 1975).
• Ambassador Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co ,102 N.M. at 32-33,690 P.2d at 1026-27.
"1999-NMCA-109,127 N.M. 603,985 P.2d 1183.
"kt at� 85,127 N.M. at 624,985 P.2d at 1204.
"kt at� 82 n.1,127 N.M. al 623 n.1,985 P.2d al 1203 n.1.
"1999-NMSC-6,127 N.M. 1,976 P.2d 1
� 18 N.M. 203,880 P.2d 300 (1994).
"See City of Hobbs v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,Slip Op. No.
CIV 95-0079 PKILFG (D.N.M. September 10,1999).
" Both Paiz and Allsup's were complex decisions,detailed analysis
of which is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that
there is language in each decision that could fairly be read lo
require evidence of a culpable state of mind beyond that necessary
to prove bad faith in order to sustain an award of punitive damages.
The following language from Paiz provides the strongest signal on
this point "As something of an exception to this line of authority,we
previously have held that an insurance carrier is liable for punitive
damages ff ii fails to exercise even slight care in discharging its
contractual obligations to its insured. In holding that the insurers
utter failure to exercise care for the interests of its insured would
support submission of the issue of punitive damages for gross
negligence, we noted in Jessen v. National Excess Insurance Co.,
108 N.M. 625,776 P.2d 1244 (1989),that 'punitive damages were
sought exclusively for reckless or grossly negligent conduct.' Id. at
627, 776 P.2d at 1246 (emphasis added). See UJI Civil 13-1827
(adopting and defining ·gross negligence' as one basis for awarding
punitive damages). In Romero v. Me1VVn's,109 N.M. 249,255 n.3,
784 P.2d 992,998 n.3 (1989),we distinguished our policy regarding
punitive damages in contract cases,generally,from our policy
regarding punitive damages for breach of insurance contracts,
specifically. However, to reaffirm that this Court has not lost sight of
the limited purpose of punitive damages-to punish and deter
persons from conduct manifesting a ·culpable mental slate'-we
now disavow the proposition that in a contract case, including one
involving an insurance contract, punitive damages may be
predicated solely on gross negligence. In addition lo,or in lieu of,
such negligence there must be evidence of an ·evil motive' or a
·culpable mental slate."' Paiz v.Slate Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 118
N.M. al 210-11,880 P.2d al 307-308. This language alone and
when read in isolation from the history of how the Supreme court
had interpreted "bad faith" would certainly provide a reasonable
basis for the court of appeal's conclusion in Teague-Strebeck.
"UJI Civil 13-1718 (NMRA 2004).
� City of Hobbs v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,No. CIV 95-0079
PKILFG Slip Op. at 10-15.
'' UJI Civil 13-1718 (NMRA 2004),Committee Comment.
� Teague-Strebeck,1999-NMSC-109,�82 n.1,127 N.M. at 623
n.1, 985 P.2d at 1203 n.1.
"kt at� 85,127 N.M. at 624,985 P.2d at 1204.
"City of Hobbs v. Nutmeg Insurance Co.,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
31144 al '16 ("Nutmeg argues that the evidence is insufficient lo
support an award for punitive damages under a standard requiring
something more than bad faith. Because we have held that the jury
was properly instructed that it could award punitive damages once
it determined that Nutmeg acted in bad faith,and Nutmeg does not
challenge the jury's finding of bad faith,we need not address the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the punitive damages
award.").
" The supreme court had denied a petition for writ of certiorari in
Teague-Strebeck. See 127 N.M. 391,981 P.2d 1209.
"See City of Hobbs v. Nutmeg Insurance Company,2000 U.S
App. LEXIS 31144 (10th Cir. 2000).
• 320 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 2003). The plaintiffs in Sloan were
represented by NMTLA stalwarts Lisa Vigil and Steve Vogel. Steve

Tucker handled the appeal.
,. Sloan v. Slate Farm Mutual Insurance Co. 2004-NMSC-004,� 1,
85 P.3d 230.
"The twist was that Stale Farm had produced two different policies
to the Sheltons. The first was 100/300 but included language that
had been the subject of several judicial constructions finding an
ambiguity and thereby making $300,000 available per person. The
second policy produced by Slate Farm was 100/300,but without
the ambiguous language. State Farm claimed the first certified
policy it had provided to plaintiffs was a mistake. This feature
certainly may have contributed lo the plaintiffs' unwillingness to
settle and therefore was evidence of the insurer's culpability in its
failure to settle. Consider also that the misrepresentation of
coverage,if the jury accepted that theory,was made to the
Sheltons,the third parties. Under Hovel v. Allstate Insurance Co..
2004-NMSC-10,_N.M.� 89 P.3d 69,there would be a
potential third party claim for violation of the Trade Practices and
Fraud Section of the insurance code - "misrepresenting to insureds
pertinent facts or policy provisions relating lo coverages at issue.''
NMSA § 59A-16-20(A).
,. Sloan v. Slate Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 360 F.3d
1220, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004).
"The best factual recitation of the case is found in the Tenth
Circuit's decision following the New Mexico Supreme Court's
decision on the certified question. See Sloan v. Stale Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,360 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2004).
00 Sloan v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,2004-NMSC-004,� 2,
_N.M. at� 85 P .3d at 232.
" kt al� 6,_N.M. at _,85 P.3d at 233-34.
"kt
"1999-NMSC-6,� 45,127 N.M. at 16, 976 P.2d at 16.
� The supreme court had made a similar obseNation some 46
years before noting rhetorically "[a]t what point does negligence
cease and bad faith begin?" Roswell State Bank v. Lawrence
Walker Cotton Co. 56 N.M. at 116,240 P.2d at 1148. See note22,
supra.
� Sloan v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 2004-NMSC-004,� 16,
_N.M. at� 85 P.3d at 236.
"kt
� In a very helpful discussion the supreme court examined the
difference between first and third party bad faith cases. This
discussion is particularly useful because historically New Mexico
appellate courts have been somewhat lax in their recognition of this
important distinction and have repeatedly blurred the lines between
these two distinct species of bad faith.
"� 2004-NMSC-004,� 18,_N.M. at� 85 P.3d at 23637.
"� 2004-NMSC-004,� 20,_N.M at� 85 P.3d at 237.
� Sloan,2004-NMSC-004,� 6�N.M. at� 85 P.3d at 234.
"kt
nThe reference is to Jessen v. National Excess Insurance Co.,108
N.M. 625,627,776 P.2d 1244, 1246 (1989), a significant first party
bad faith case. Jessen held that "[b]ad faith supports punitive
damages upon a finding of entitlement to compensatory damages."
Jessen v. National Excess Insurance Co.,108 N.M. at 627,776
P.2d at 1246. Jessen rested on United Nuclear Corporation v.
Allendale Mutual Insurance Co., 103 N.M. 480,709 P.2d 649
(1985),in which the Supreme Court held that "[t]o assess punitive
damages for breach of an insurance policy there must be evidence
of bad faith or malice in the insurer's refusal to pay the claim.'' Id. at
485,709 P.2d at 654. The court then noted that "'[b]ad faith' has
been defined as meaning · any frivolous or unfounded refusal to
pay." Quoting State Farm General Insurance Co. v. Clifton,86 N.M.
757,759,527 P.2d 798,800 (1974). Taken at face value the
discussion in Allendale would appear to confirm that evidence of a
prima facie case for first party bad faith is sufficient to get to the jury
on punitive damages.
n Sloan,2004-NMSC--004,,23,_N.M. at� 85 P.3d at 238.
"kt
" Sloan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 360 F.3d
1220 (10th Cir. 2004).
"Sloan,2004-NMSC--004,ffl] 16,17,_N.M. at _, 85 P.3d at
236.
"See UJI 13-1702,13-1704. � 2004-NMSC--004,,17,
_N.M. at� 85 P.3d at 236.
• Sloan,2004-NMSC--004,� 16, _N.M. at _,85 P.3d at 236.
"kt
., Sloan,2004-NMSC--004,� 20,_N.M. al� 85 P.3d at 237.
" Sloan,2004-NMSC--004,, 22,_N.M. at� 85 P .3d at 238.
"kt
"kt
� Sloan,2004-NMSC--004,ffll 23,_N.M. at� 85 P.3d at 238
("As a result of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that in most
cases,the plaintiffs theory of bad faith, if proven,will logically also
support punitive damages.").
M 102 N.M. 28, 30,690 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1984).
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